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 Introduction 
 Urbanization is one of the most dynamic and challenging development processes 
because of large-scale, low-income, rural-urban migration and increasing popula-
tion concentration in limited geographic areas. Geographic concentration of popu-
lation not only presents opportunities and the potential for economic growth but 
also creates numerous issues and problems. Urban agglomerative economies drive 
a city to grow while congestion, urban environment, urban infrastructure and pub-
lic services, and public health and safety affect the well-being of business activities 
and urban residents. 1 In addition, pressures on providing adequate employment 
opportunities and affordable houses for low-income rural-urban migrants are 
enormous during periods of rapid urbanization. 
 1 .   Marshall ( 1920 ) identifi ed three sources of agglomeration economies: knowledge spillovers, 
input sharing, and labor pooling. These sources generate urbanization economies and localization 
economies, enhancing population concentration and industrial clustering. Many empirical studies 
have provided evidence for urban agglomerative effects (e.g., see the review by  Rosenthal and 
Strange  2004 ) . 
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 This chapter examines urbanization in Japan, South Korea, and mainland 
China (China). These three countries offer interesting cases that deserve a thorough 
examination for the following reasons. First of all, they share similar features in 
urbanization. Both Japan and South Korea experienced rapid urbanization in the 
second half of the twentieth century while China is currently in the era of rapid 
urbanization. Second, urbanization in these three countries is largely driven by 
industrialization, and so they do not face problems resulting from overurbanization 
as in Latin American countries. Third, all of these three countries have national 
policies and programs to manage urbanization and urban growth. Finally, although 
the three countries are distinct from each other in many aspects such as economic 
structure, growth stage, natural endowment, and institutional arrangements in 
managing urban growth, they share common features such as objectives and goals, 
policy instruments, and approaches in urbanization management. It would be very 
interesting to line up these three countries that are currently at different economic 
development stages and to examine the interaction between policy response and 
urbanization reality. It would also be of great importance to understand how effec-
tive the policy and planning efforts in these countries are and what lessons can be 
learned for other developing countries. 
 This chapter attempts to examine the following three questions: (1) What are 
the urbanization patterns, and to what extent are they linked to economic growth 
during rapid urbanization periods? (2) What sorts of policy instruments have been 
introduced to manage urbanization at both national and local levels? (3) How effec-
tive are these policies, and what lessons can be learned? 
 The chapter is organized as follows.  Section  2 describes urbanization and urban 
growth.  Section  3 presents policy and planning efforts in managing urbanization 
and urban growth while  section  4 conducts an assessment.  Section  5 concludes with 
fi nal remarks. 
 Urbanization and Urban Growth 
 One common feature shared by Japan, South Korea, and China is that they all have 
experienced fast urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century. In a his-
torical perspective, Japan took the lead, followed by South Korea and then China. 
Japan started its urbanization before World War II and accelerated it in the post-
war period. Its urbanization level more than doubled, from 37.3 percent in 1950 to 
76.2 percent in 1980, and then slowed down in the 1980s and 1990s  (table  39.1 ) . 2 
South Korea’s urbanization did not accelerate until the end of the Korean War. The 
 2 .  Urbanization level here is defi ned as the share of the urban population in national total 
population, and industrialization level is defi ned as the share of the nonagricultural employment. 
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following three decades witnessed rapid urbanization, with its urbanization level 
increasing from 42.1 percent in 1966 to 79.6 percent in 1990 and overtaking that of 
Japan. In China, urbanization had been stagnant before 1978 when the famous 
open-door policy was fi rst introduced. From 1980 to 2000, the urbanization level 
of China grew from 19.4 percent to 36.2 percent at a fast pace. It is anticipated that 
this trend will continue at a speed of 1 percentage point per year in the foreseeable 
future  (Yeung and Shen  2008 ) . 
 As in other developed countries, urbanization and urban population growth 
are largely driven by economic growth in these three countries. For instance, Japan’s 
industrialization level increased by 43.5 percentage points while its urbanization 
level increased by 41.4 percentage points in 1950–2000. From 1966 to 1995, South 
Korea had its urbanization and industrialization grow by 42.9 percentage points 
and 45.3 percentage points, respectively (see  table  39.1 ) . In China, urbanization 
increased by 16.8 percentage points while industrialization increased by 18.7 per-
centage points in 1980–2000. The per capita GDP in China jumped from $856 in 
2000 to $3,313 in 2008. This striking growth has pushed its urbanization to a new 
level. In 2008, urbanization in China reached 45.7 percent, gaining almost 10 per-
centage points in eight years. 3 
 Another feature shared by all three countries is related to regional disparity in 
urban growth and economic development. In Japan, economic concentration 
heavily favors the Pacifi c Belt region, which produced 71 to 78 percent of national 
 Table 39.1 Urbanization and Industrialization in Japan, South Korea and China 
 Japan 
  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
 Industrialization  51.5  67.3  80.7  89.1  92.9  95.0 
 Urbanization  37.3  65.2  72.1  76.2  77.4  78.7 
 South Korea 
  1966  1970  1980  1990  1995 
 Industrialization  42.1  49.6  66.0  81.7  87.4 
 Urbanization  42.1  49.8  66.7  79.6  85.0 
 China 
  1962  1970  1980  1990  2000 
 Industrialization  17.9  19.2  31.3  39.9  50 
 Urbanization  17.3  17.4  19.4  26.4  36.2 
 Source : Japan Census 2000; Sorensen 2002; Kwon 2001; NBSC b, c. 
 3 .  People’s Daily Online, April 15, 2009,  http://english.people.com.cn/
90001/90776/90882/6637891.html . 
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manufacturing output from 1909 to 1980  (Sorensen  2002 ) . 4 The dominance of the 
region has remained in the postindustrialization period. In Japan, 24.2 percent of 
the land housed 61.5 percent of the nation’s population in 2000, generated 67 per-
cent of the national GDP in 2005, and created nearly 60 percent of the total employ-
ment opportunities in 2006  (table  39.2 ) . The region is also the home of the three 
largest metropolitan areas (MAs) in Japan (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya MAs). 
 It is worthwhile pointing out that two industrial shifts in Japan have further 
strengthened the economic concentration in the three largest MAs. The fi rst shift took 
place in the 1950s through mid-1970s, with industrial restructuring from agricultural to 
heavy and chemical industries. During this period, 11 million people had moved into 
the three MAs. The second shift started in the mid-1970s to the 1980s and transferred 
from heavy industry to high-tech and service industries. Marked by the oil crisis in 
1973, the second industrial shift was deeply infl uenced by the wave of globalization, 
emphasizing international connections and global production. Tokyo MA benefi ted 
most from it. As a result, by turning quickly from large-scale heavy industry to small 
and fl exible high-tech fi rms, Tokyo became a global center for business, fi nance, and 
modern service industries. In the mid-1980s, Tokyo MA had already concentrated 
83.4 percent of the banking, 86.6 percent of the foreign bank employees, 62.5 percent of 
the foreign corporate estates, and 59 percent of corporate headquarters offi ces and even 
attracted headquarters from Osaka MA  (Takahashi and Sugiura  1996 ) . 
 It is also noteworthy that only Tokyo MA maintained net in-migration during 
the second shift, making it continuously grow even though central Tokyo began to 
lose population starting in 1965. Rising concentration of business activities and 
 Table 39.2  Economic and Population Concentration of Pacifi c Belt and Three 
MAs in Japan (percent) 
  Area  Population  GDP  Number of 
Establishments 
 Employment  Annual 
Sales 
 Year  2000  2000  2005  2006  2006  2003 
 Pacifi c Belt  24.2  61.5  67.0  59.6  59.3  61.2 
 Tokyo MA  3.6  26.3  31.8  24.2  22.4  22.5 
 Osaka MA  5.7  14.5  13.8  14.3  14.3  13.7 
 Nagoya MA  4.9  8.7  9.8  9.0  11.0  12.5 
 Sum of three 
MAs 
 14.2  49.5  55.4  47.5  47.7  48.7 
 Source : Japan Census 2000; PSOSJ 2009. 
 4 .  Japan is composed of forty-seven prefectures. The Pacifi c Belt covers sixteen prefectures; it 
is composed Tokyo MA (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba), Osaka MA (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo 
and Nara), and Nagoya MA (Aichi, Gifu, and Mie), and fi ve other prefectures: Fukuoka, 
Yamaguchi, Hiroshima, Okayama, and Shizuoka  (Fujita and Tabuchi  1997 ;  OECD  1987 ;  Sorensen 
 2002 ; Fourth National Comprehensive Development Plan of Japan 1987). 
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population made Tokyo MA the largest megacity in the world and one of the dens-
est MAs. It housed 33.4 million of population and produced around 30 percent of 
national GDP in 2000 on the land of 4 percent of Japan’s territory  (Fujita and 
Tabuchi  1997 ;  Japan Census  2000 ;  PSOSJ  2009 ) . 
 Regional disparity in South Korea is even more striking. Economic activities have 
been disproportionally concentrated in the Seoul and Pusan MAs, particularly Seoul 
MA. 5 The Seoul MA, also called the Seoul Capital Region, became the biggest reser-
voir of industrialization and urbanization. The region’s population share steadily 
increased from 23.7 percent in 1966 to 45.4 percent in 1995 and then to 48.2 percent in 
2005, with the population growing to more than 21 million  (table  39.3 ) . The trend of 
population concentration was matched by increasing economic  concentration. In 
the 1990s, this region contained 61.7 percent of high-tech fi rms, 80 per cent of qualifi ed 
universities, and 96 percent of head offi ces  (Hong  1997 ) ; in 2000, the region produced 
47.8 percent of the national GDP on 11.8 percent of the country’s territory (of which 
1,567 square kilometers, or 13.3 percent, are taken by greenbelt space in the region; 
 KNSO  2005 ;  Bae and Jun  2003 ) . Also similar to Tokyo MA, Seoul City, located in the 
core of the Seoul Capital Region, has experienced population decline since 1993 while 
the whole region’s population continued to grow. 
 China’s postreform regional disparity of industrial development was mainly 
caused by rapidly rising economic activities along the eastern coastal area that ben-
efi t greatly from the surge of foreign direct investments (FDIs) and booming export-
oriented industries. The economic importance of the eastern coastal area steadily 
 5 .  South Korea is composed of sixteen provincial divisions, including nine provinces, six 
metropolitan cities, and one special city, Seoul. The Seoul Capital Region includes Seoul City, 
Incheon City, and Gyeonggi Province  (Hong  1997 ;  Ahn and Ohn  2001 ) . 
 Table 39.3 Population Growth of Seoul City and Capital Region (in 1,000s) 
 Year  National 
Population 
 Pop. In 
Seoul City 
 %  Population in 
Capital Region 
 % 
 1960  24,989  2,445  9.8  
 1966  29,156  3,793  13  6,896  23.7 
 1970  30,882  5,433  17.6  8,730  28.3 
 1975  34,707  6,900  19.9  10,938  31.5 
 1980  37,436  8,364  22.3  13,298  35.5 
 1985  40,449  9,639  23.8  15,821  39.1 
 1990  43,411  10,163  23.4  18,136  41.8 
 1993  44,056  10,672  24.3  19,669  44.6 
 1995  44,609  10,231  22.9  20,267  45.4 
 2000  46,136  9,895  21.4  21,354  46.3 
 2005  47,279  9,820  20.8  22,767  48.2 
 Source : 1960–1995 data are from Ahn and Ohn 2001; 2000–2005 data are from  http://www.citypopulation.de/
KoreaSouth-Mun.html . 
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increased from 1978 to 2004. In 2004, it amassed more than 58 percent of national 
GDP and fi xed asset investment, more than 88 percent of international trade, and 
more than 83 percent of FDI, on 13.9 percent of China’s territory  (table  39.4 ) . 
Relatively, its population increase looks not as dramatic. From 1978 to 1998, the 
eastern coastal area accommodated 52.3 percent of urban population growth; 6 in 
2004, it housed 38 percent of total population. Urban population growth thus 
appears to have lagged compared with the economic growth in the coastal areas. 
However, these offi cially published data may understate urban population growth 
because considerable rural-urban migration is not counted as urban population; 
we will further discuss this issue later. 
 Unlike Japan and South Korea, however, China’s largest cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai are far less dominant in terms of population and economic concentra-
tions. This may be partly due to its huge sizes of land and population and partly due 
to the absence of fully developed metropolitan areas. It may not take long to have 
some large cities emerge as MAs in China, especially in the Yangtze delta region and 
the Pearl River delta region. 
 Urbanization Policy and City 
Growth Management 
 Facing rapid urbanization, Japan, South Korea, and China all have introduced and 
implemented urbanization policies and city growth management programs that 
primarily target regional balance in growth and concentration. The motivation was 
the increasing concern over issues and problems associated with population size 
and density, such as pollution, overcrowdedness, traffi c congestion, and rising hous-
ing prices. The correlation between the extent of these problems and urban size has 
 Table 39.4 Economic Importance of Eastern Coastal Area of China 
 Year  Population  GDP  Fixed Asset 
Investment 
 Import/Export  FDI 
 1978  37.49  50.22  46.71  na  na 
 1985  37.5  51.05  51.55  na  na 
 1990  37.56  51.69  55.9  73.81  na 
 1995  37.47  56.06  62.58  75.96  81.21 
 2000  37.65  57.26  58.05  86.12  84.89 
 2004  37.69  58.53  58.94  88.44  83.28 
 Source : NBSC 2005b. 
 6 .  Here the urban population refers to nonagricultural population in the city proper ( shiqu ). 
Data from  Lin ( 2001 ) . 
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increasingly drawn attention in policy and planning arenas. These three countries 
have attempted to deal with them at both national and local levels. The national 
policy and planning initiatives were usually required or mandated to be imple-
mented at the local level. Thus these three countries adopted more or less a hierar-
chical or top-down approach in managing urban growth. This commonality may 
be rooted in their shared culture. 
 Japan 
 National Policy 
 In the 1960s, Japan initiated its efforts to manage urbanization at both national and 
local levels. Japan’s Comprehensive National Development Plan (CNDP) was intro-
duced as a main vehicle to implement the objective of balanced regional develop-
ment. Since 1962, fi ve CNDPs have been drafted. They are from 1962, 1969, 1972, 
1987, and 1998, corresponding to the First through Fifth Plans. Due to political rea-
sons, the Third Comprehensive National Development Plan (from 1972) was never 
implemented; the Fifth Plan was implemented in the new century. 
 The primary objectives of the First CNDP were to reduce regional gaps in 
economic development through a growth pole strategy. The First CNDP divided 
the nation’s territory into three kinds: excessive concentration areas, areas of 
adjustment, and development areas. The excessive concentration areas, including 
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, were designated to restrict industrial growth and to 
encourage factory relocation. The areas of adjustment referred to the surround-
ing regions of large cities, where industrial fi rms were encouraged to relocate and 
suburban centers were supposed to develop. The development areas were places 
in which growth was promoted. Under the First CNDP, two concrete deconcen-
tration programs, the New Industrial City (NIC) program and the Special Area 
(SA) program, were initiated and implemented nationwide in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Fifteen NICs and six SAs were designated under the umbrella of the growth pole 
strategy, targeting at alleviating the overconcentration in the major MAs and dis-
tributing development in broader areas for more balanced development  (Glickman 
 1979 ) . 
 The First CNDP proved ineffective, as indicated by the rapid population 
growth in large cities and MAs in the 1960s. This triggered the Second CNDP 
(1969), which continued to embrace the growth pole strategy but adopted some-
what different approaches. The Second Plan aimed at building entire new cities, 
encouraged industrial relocation to less developed areas, and emphasized improv-
ing communication and transportation systems such as high-speed railways, 
highways, and telecommunication systems  (Glickman  1979 ) . Ironically, these 
investments in transportation and communication also greatly improved the 
accessibility of the largest metropolitan areas, making large cities and MAs more 
attractive and appealing for business activities and population. Consequently, 
regional gaps increased contrary to designed policy objectives. 
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 The Fourth CNDP, announced in 1987, marked fundamental changes in city 
management in Japan. Even though the policy objectives of balanced growth and 
reduction of regional disparity remained intact, implementation instruments had 
changed. It replaced the growth pole strategy with an income-transferring scheme. 
Policy focuses were also shifted by emphasizing utilization of local resources and 
establishment of economic linkages to existing metropolitan areas, particularly to 
Tokyo MA, rather than building complete new industrial cities. The most dramatic 
change was refl ected in the fact that the roles of large cities were reassessed and 
urban agglomerative effects were widely recognized. This changed the ways in which 
policies and plans were developed. Previously, they were largely driven by issues and 
problems resulting from urbanization; since then, policies have been more focused 
on guiding and facilitating effi cient economic development. Finally, consensus on 
failures of previous efforts in containing the growth of large cities began to build 
up, leading to a favorable view of large cities and realization of Tokyo MA’s impor-
tance as a global city. 
 The Fifth CNDP, entitled “Grand Design for the 21st Century—Promotion of 
Regional Independence and Creation of Beautiful National Land,” is the most recent 
one. As its title suggests, the plan continued to stress utilizing local resources to 
establish regional independence, and it emphasized environmental issues. Also, the 
Fifth Plan de-emphasized population overconcentration in MAs, based on the fore-
cast of a decreasing and aging population in the future. Rather, it listed “renovate 
metropolitan areas” as one of its four strategies for realizing its fi ve basic objectives. 7 
Meanwhile, interregional cooperation and improvement on transportation and 
communication were further stressed. 
 Local Policy: Tokyo Metropolitan Area Management 
 Constraining growth of the largest MA is imperative to decentralize economic 
growth and to achieve spatially more balanced development. Under this under-
standing, five Capital Region Development Plans (CRDPs) have been approved 
to restrict and manage Tokyo’s growth in 1956, 1968, 1976, 1986, and 1998, 
respectively. 
 The most famous policy instrument in the First CRDP was the introduction of 
the greenbelt to restrict growth. The plan divided Tokyo MA into three categories: 
the existing built-up urban area, the suburban zone (the greenbelt), and the neigh-
boring regions (satellite cities) beyond the greenbelt. While strict controls were 
made in the existing built-up areas to limit industries and universities, incentives 
 7 .  The fi ve objectives are create regions that are independent and that residents can take pride 
in; make Japan a safe and comfortable place to live; enjoy and nourish sound nature’s blessing; 
build a vigorous economic society; and make the nation open to the world. The four strategies are 
build nature-rich residential areas; renovate metropolitan areas; form regional cooperation 
corridors; and form international spheres of interaction on a large scale.  http://www.mlit.go.jp/
kokudokeikaku/zs5-e/index.html . 
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were provided to channel development to the neighboring satellite cities outside the 
greenbelt. The greenbelt was expected to form a clear separation between Tokyo 
and its surrounding areas  (BCPTMG  2004 ) . It was also expected that the prohibi-
tion of new land development (such as new construction and expansion of factories 
and schools) in the built-up areas would relocate growth to unrestricted areas so 
that regional disparity could be reduced. 
 The Second CRDP was developed in 1968. It abolished the greenbelt and desig-
nated the whole area outside the existing built-up area within 50 kilometers of 
Tokyo Station as the Suburban Development Area. It also focused on improvement 
of regional public transportation such as mass transit systems and a regional high-
way network. The transportation improvement was targeted at development of 
existing urban areas and new towns. An urban growth boundary was introduced in 
the New Urban Planning Law to promote growth in designated areas by separating 
“urban development promotion areas” and “urbanization control areas.” It was 
worth highlighting the fact that Tokyo’s greenbelt was short-lived. It was abolished 
so soon mainly because of strong development pressure and fi erce political opposi-
tion from property owners and developers  (Sorensen  2002 ) . This suggests that plans 
in Japan were sensitive to changes in demand and fl exible to better adjust to chang-
ing reality. 
 The Third CRDP (1976) focused on a polycentric urban spatial form and 
 promoted the growth of subcenters, as a new measure to promote balanced 
urban development and to relieve excessive concentration in the traditional Cen-
tral Business District (CBD). The polycentric development strategy was further 
strengthened in the Fourth CRDP (1986) by developing business cores in every 
city. Moreover, consistent with the Fourth CNDP, the Fourth CRDP also indicated 
its intention to maintain Tokyo’s function as a global business center, marking a 
clear strategic change in managing Tokyo MA’s urban development. In this plan, 
an eclectic strategy of “selective inducement and relocation” was adopted, which 
tried to compromise between the goal of being a world city and the objective of 
solving problems of overconcentration  (Saito and Thornley  2003 ) . Although over-
concentration was still one of the top concerns, the plan showed its intention to 
further attract businesses and headquarters to Tokyo MA. In the Fifth CRDP 
(1998), the objectives of regional structure maintained its focus on rectifying the 
concentration to the center of Tokyo and facilitating formation of core cities for 
each of the subregions, which were expected to become autonomous areas. 
 South Korea 
 South Korea’s urbanization policies bear a close resemblance to those of Japan in 
terms of their goals and objectives. Urbanization policies were fi rst introduced in 
the 1960s when the country went through rapid industrialization and urbanization. 
Since the Seoul Capital Region, as the biggest MA in South Korea, was so dominant 
in terms of size distributions of population and economic activities, containing and 
redirecting growth away from Seoul became a critical element to achieve the national 
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objectives of promoting balanced development and encouraging deconcentration 
in the Seoul Capital Region  (Ahn and Ohn  2001 ) . 
 National Policy 
 The National Comprehensive Development Plan was initiated in the early 1960s as 
the most important national policy on urbanization. With the enactment of the 
Urban Planning Act of 1962 and the Comprehensive National Development Planning 
Law of 1963, the First Comprehensive National Physical Development Plan (CNPDP) 
(1972–1981) was formulated in 1971  (Cho  2002 ;  Douglass  2000 ) . 
 Perhaps the most famous concept in the First CNPDP was the introduction of 
the Development Restricted Zone, which was commonly known as the greenbelt 
 (Jun and Hur  2001 ) . The objective of greenbelt designations was to control rapid 
urbanization in large cities, especially in Seoul, by prohibiting development in 
greenbelts. It was hoped that growth would happen outside the greenbelts so as to 
force growth to other regions. There were fourteen cities that established greenbelts 
between 1971 and 1973. 
 Another core policy element in the First CNPDP was the Seoul Population 
Redistribution Plan (SPRP), passed in 1977. Despite the title, the plan was a national 
effort to redirect population growth away from Seoul to other cities. Based on the 
forecast that Seoul’s population would grow from 7.4 million in 1977 to 11.4 million 
in 1986, the main objective of SPRP was to control Seoul’s population around 7 mil-
lion. The national government adopted two implementation measures. One was to 
create the National Population Redistribution Coordinating Committee, chaired by 
the prime minister, to coordinate governmental efforts as well as regional collabora-
tion  (Kim and Donaldson  1979 ) . The other included a wide range of comprehensive 
efforts such as nationwide land-use management (which controlled land uses and 
development of industrial estates, based on the National Land Use Management 
Law of 1972), designation of regional cities (fi ve cities with targeted population of 
0.2 to 1 million in 1978), and industrial redistribution (which divided the nation 
into three zones: Industrial Inducement Areas, Limited Inducement Areas, and 
Industrial Relocation Areas, based on the Industrial Redistribution Law of 1977). 
Seoul City and its immediate vicinity were designed as Industrial Relocation Areas 
so that new industrial development was prohibited and research and educational 
institutes were not allowed to expand. Financial incentives and tax penalties were 
imposed to encourage industrial development or relocation. In addition, govern-
ments took measures to control land prices and fi nanced infrastructure in desig-
nated areas for development. 
 The focus on dispersion of growth and regional balance was further stressed in 
the Second, Third, and the most recent Fourth CNPDPs. The Second CNPDP 
(1982–1991), for instance, contained two key policy recommendations. One was to 
promote regional integration, and the other was to adopt a growth pole strategy, 
both aiming at reducing regional gaps while employing different approaches. The 
former focused on linkages between city nodes and rural areas in order to make 
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services and job opportunities provided in city nodes accessible to rural residents. 
The latter emphasized the concept of concentrated deconcentration and chose pro-
vincial cities as growth poles, hoping to strengthen growth potentials of these cities 
so as to prevent population concentration in the Seoul Capital Region. 
 The Fourth Plan changed its name to the Comprehensive National Territory 
Plan (CNTP) (2000–2020). Among its fi ve objectives, balanced territory was the 
fi rst. 8 This plan maintained the emphasis on building a multinucleic decentralized 
territorial structure as well as linkages and cooperation among regions. What is 
more, a strategy of building self-supporting regions and emphasis on an effi cient 
transportation system were stressed. The plan also emphasized different develop-
ment guidelines for different regions. 
 Local Policy: Seoul Metropolitan Area Management 
 Besides the national efforts, regional policies specifi cally for the Seoul Capital 
Region were also formed. A series of efforts have been launched since the 
 mid-1960s. First, Special Measures for the Restriction of Population Growth in 
Seoul were introduced in 1964  (Ahn and Ohn  2001 ) . In order to control growth in 
Seoul City, industrial parks were established along major transportation corridors, 
and new land developments (commercial, offi ce, and residential) were expanded to 
the southern areas along the Han River. Urban renewal programs began to clear out 
slum housing in the inner part of Seoul City and replaced it with commercial and 
offi ce buildings. New industrial construction and expansion of research and educa-
tional institutes in Seoul City were also prohibited. 
 Second, according to the First CNPDP, a greenbelt that formed a geographic 
band surrounding the city was established in 1971 to control Seoul’s sprawl. The 
band is on average 19 kilometers in width and located about 14 kilometers from the 
Seoul’s CBD. After many adjustments, it occupies 1,566.8 square kilometers  (Bae 
and Jun  2003 ) . 
 Third, the Capital Regional Plan was fi rst developed in 1984. The plan divided 
the Seoul Capital Region into fi ve functioning zones: Relocation Promotion 
Zone, Restricted Rearrangement Zone, Development Inducement Zone, Natu-
ral Preservation Zone, and Development Reservation Zone. Different policies 
were designed for and applied to the five zones to achieve the goals their names 
implied. 
 Finally, the New Town Development Plan was announced in 1989, which in fact 
marked a compromise to the failure of urban containment policies. Five new towns 
were developed in fi ve years to accommodate housing needs for 300,000 house-
holds or 1.2 million people  (Jun and Hur  2001 ) . New town development was a part 
of government efforts to address housing shortage and skyrocketing housing prices 
caused primarily by strict control on development in greenbelts. 
 8 .  The fi ve objectives are balanced territory, open territory, welfare territory, green territory, 
and unifi ed territory (MLTM 2009). 
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 Starting from the 1990s, the general framework of growth management in Seoul 
Capital Region began to change. The fi ve functioning zones were reconsolidated 
into three in 1991: Overconcentration Restriction Zone, Growth Management Zone, 
and Nature Preservation Zone. Land use and development became more fl exible. 
Different land uses were set different development limits within which a certain 
degree of freedom was permitted in site selection of land development. Also, the 
scheme of development impact fees was used to manage urban growth, which 
marked a shift from the traditional regulatory approach to more fl exible and incen-
tive-based ones  (Ahn and Ohn  2001 ) . 
 China 
 Like Japan and South Korea, China has nationwide policies to manage urbanization 
and city growth. 9 Unlike Japan, South Korea, and many other countries, however, 
China has nationwide administrative systems that greatly affect mobility of popula-
tion and rural-urban migration. China’s urbanization policy is thus in some senses 
more effective and infl uential mainly because of its top-down administrative sys-
tems that convey strong state infl uences. Several institutional mechanisms have 
been used to manage and control urbanization and urban growth in China: the 
 hukou system, urban development strategy, the central government’s authority in 
granting city status, city planning, and land-use planning. 
 Hukou System 
 China has a distinct  hukou system to manage its urbanization process. This is a 
household registration system that limits population mobility between juris-
dictions in general and rural-urban migration in particular. It is difficult for 
rural  hukou holders to live in the city without obtaining an urban  hukou , which 
is required to access urban services such as health care, social security, and 
education. 
 This mobility restriction by the  hukou system leads to two major consequences 
for urbanization. One is related to the urban agglomerative effects. Empirical stud-
ies show that cities could have grown much faster than they have if migration con-
trols were released, since rural-urban mobility restriction by the  hukou system 
hinders urban agglomeration  (Henderson  2007 ) . The other is associated with the 
fl oating population, a unique phenomenon referring to rural residents (with a rural 
 hukou ) who work and live in cities. 10 It was estimated that there were 150 to 
 9 .  Here we focus on policies during the postreform period since 1978. 
 10 .  Since 1980s, China’s urbanization shifted from previous single-track to a dual-track 
model. In the prereform period, urbanization was on one track of the state-sponsored approach, 
in which urbanization only referred to growth of people with nonagricultural  hukou . Since early 
1980s, another track called “spontaneous urbanization” emerged as the second track, which 
includes rural migration without urban  hukou  (Yeung and Shen  2008 ) . 
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250  million fl oating people in 2008. According to the way in which urban popula-
tion is counted (since the early twenty-fi rst century, part of the fl oating population 
began to be counted as urban population if they have continuously lived in a city for 
more than six months), it is apparent that not all the fl oating population are included 
in statistics of urban population. Therefore, the reported urban population is sub-
ject to substantial underestimation. 
 Urban Development Strategy 
 China’s national urbanization strategy, greatly favoring small cities and towns, 
was established in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In the third National City 
Working Conference in 1978, this strategy was formally adopted as “controlling 
the scale of large cities, and encouraging development of small cities and towns.” 11 
Further, in 1980 the National City Planning Working Conference added the prin-
ciple of “properly developing medium sized cities.” In 1989, this strategy was writ-
ten into the fi rst City Planning Law. This city-size-based urban development 
strategy had been carried out as the top guideline for almost three decades and 
had greatly infl uenced urbanization and urban growth in China. It was not until 
2008 that this small-cities favored policy was abolished and replaced by the City-
Rural Planning Law. 
 Government’s Control on City Establishment 
 One way of implementing China’s urban development strategy is through the 
administrative channel of granting city status. The rapid increase in the number of 
small cities and towns in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the direct outcome of the 
small-cities favored growth policy. The number of small cities increased by 244 from 
1980 to 1990 and further increased by 104 from 1990 to 2000. In contrast, the num-
ber of medium-sized and large cities increased by 155 in the two decades  (NBSC 
 1999 ,  2001 ,  2005a ) . 12 Since the authority of granting city status relied solely on the 
central government, the national strategy had stronger infl uences on urbanization 
in China than in Japan and South Korea. 
 Cities in China are not just economic entities but also have enormous adminis-
trative privileges. In general, higher-level cities have more leverage in levying taxes 
and fees and large bargaining powers in obtaining intergovernmental transfers; they 
 11 .  Before 1986, a large city was defi ned as having 0.5 million or more nonagricultural 
population living in the urban built-up areas and suburbs, a medium-sized city should have 0.2 to 
0.5 million nonagricultural population, and a small city should have less than 0.2 million 
nonagricultural population. After 1986, the population ranges were raised to 1 million and above, 
0.3 to 1 million, and less than 0.3 million for large, medium-sized, and small cities, respectively 
( http://www.china001.com/ ). 
 12 .  Small, medium-sized, and large cities here are defi ed by the nonagricultural population in 
the city proper ( shiqu ), the ranges are less than 0.2 million, 0.2 to 1 million, and 1 million and 
above, respectively. Data source:  NBSC  1999 ;  2001 ,  2005a . 
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also enjoy more autonomy in budget preparation and government expenditure 
decisions. There are many cases in which the size of a government in terms of 
employment is determined mainly by its administrative status, rather than actual 
city scales of population and economic output. 13 For instance, Kunshan is a county-
level city located in Jiangsu Province. It had 600,000 people with local  hukou (often 
called  changzhu renkou ) and 1.4 million people without local  hukou (fl oating popu-
lation) in 2005. The maximum number of staff in Kunshan’s urban planning depart-
ment is around 30, which is jointly determined by local population and city 
administrative status. An urban planning department in prefecture-level cities with 
populations of 2 million usually has a staff of 100 to 200. The city-status-determined 
quota or ceiling implies understaffi ng in Kunshan City. Thus upgrading to a 
 higher-level administrative status (from bottom to top: town, county-level city, and 
prefecture-level city) means substantial increases in government size and fi scal 
capacity. Recognizing the potential economic impacts, the central government had 
established many small cities and towns in 1980s and 1990s to promote growth, 
particularly in less developed regions. 
 Urban Planning 
 Urban master plans determine growth targets of city scale or urban population, 
designate physical areas for urban development in the planning horizon, and fore-
cast demand for land as well as urban infrastructure. The Beijing Master Plan of 
1992–1993, for instance, determined two development quotas by 2010: one was the 
population size target of 15 million people (including 2.5 million fl oating popula-
tion), and the other was built-up areas of 900 square kilometers. 14 The population 
growth quota was used to guide the provision of urban basic services and infra-
structure while the land development quota was designed to physically control 
urban spatial growth. 
 The vertical management of urban development is refl ected in the fact that 
these development quotas are not determined at the local level but approved by the 
higher level of government. For instance, it is mandated that urban master plans of 
province-level cities should be approved by the State Council while province capital 
cities, cities with more than 1 million population, and cities that are specifi ed by the 
State Council should be approved fi rst by province-level governments and then by 
the State Council. Other cities’ urban master plans should be approved by province-
level governments. Thus the size of population growth in the planning horizon and 
the extent to which a city can grow spatially are not merely local decisions. The 
infl uences of the higher-level governments in planning urban development are 
undoubtedly strong in China. 
 13 .  There are four province-level cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing); 15 
semi-province-level cities (Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Guangzhou, Nanjing etc.); 268 prefecture-
level cities; and 374 county-level cities by 2005. 
 14 .  In fact, the target of built-up areas was exceeded by 250 square kilometers by 2003. 
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 Land Policy and Land-Use Planning 
 Urban growth is a land development process in essence. Therefore, any land policy 
that affects land conversion into urban uses would infl uence urban growth. The 
unique institutional setting that governs land use and land development in China 
empowers land policies and land-use plans to manage and control urban growth. 
First of all, landownership is divided between urban and rural areas. Land in both 
cities and towns is state-owned while land in rural areas is collectively owned by 
farmers. Second, collective-owned land is prohibited from development for urban 
purposes unless the ownership is converted to state ownership. Third, China has 
introduced a land-use quota system as a way to protect farmland. This system basi-
cally sets the maximum amount of land that can be converted into urban uses from 
agricultural uses within planning periods. Finally, the quota is determined through 
the top-down administrative channel. For instance, the amount of land allowed to 
be developed for each province is determined by the national government, and each 
provincial government in turn determines the quota for its subdivisions. In princi-
ple, this setting for land management suggests that urban development would be 
impossible without permission from the higher-level governments. 
 Assessment of Urbanization and 
Growth Management Policy 
 Japan 
 In general, the policy objectives in the second half of the twentieth century in man-
aging urbanization and containing large cities, particularly Tokyo, can hardly claim 
to be successful. This is mainly because population and economic activities became 
even more concentrated in large cities and the major MAs, though policy and plan-
ning efforts were launched to prevent this from happening. Outcomes from the 
growth pole strategy were mixed. Many designated growth poles grew slower than 
other cities, and not as many jobs as expected were provided  (Glickman  1979 ) . NICs 
and SAs located close to the major MAs mostly grew while others located farther 
away did not  (Osada  2003 ) . The policy failure in dispersing growth during rapid 
urbanization is also manifested by the frequent revisions of Japan’s CNDPs, whose 
focuses have shifted remarkably. 
 The policies aiming at containing Tokyo growth ended in vain. The greenbelt 
was very short-lived, and efforts in establishing subcenters in Tokyo’s outskirts pro-
duced mixed results  (Saito and Thornley  2003 ) . Not all designated subcenters and 
new towns experienced obvious population growth. Only three subcenters in the 
northern arc and Tama new town and Kohoku new town have witnessed rapid pop-
ulation density growth. Employment in some subcenters (such as Shinjuku and 
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Shibuya) had grown faster while many of the others grew at rather similar rates of 
municipalities not designated. 
 City size does not matter if the city is well planned, particularly with well-inte-
grated land use and transportation. The Tokyo MA is the biggest megacity in the 
world, with 34 million in population. In spite of the failure of the major planning 
objective, it is still considered to be a successful city with effi cient services, mobility, 
accessibility, and amenities for all classes of people  (World Bank  2009 ) . This is 
largely due to the dominant role of the public transport network in urban spatial 
growth in Japan. Tokyo has relied on railway networks to accommodate daily travel 
demand within the metropolitan area. Since the 1950s, approximately ten kilome-
ters of new subway line were constructed every year, leading to a considerable share 
of railway ridership that has accounted for almost two-thirds of public transporta-
tion demand. 
 There are several speculations for why Japan’s urbanization policies have in 
general failed to achieve the intended objectives and goals. First, urban develop-
ment policy and planning practice paid little attention to market infl uences or 
urban agglomerative effects, particularly in the early stage of rapid urbanization. 
For example, during the fi rst structural shift toward heavy industries, it was very 
diffi cult to constrain rural-urban migration and to contain urban population 
growth. Similarly, the economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s from heavy 
industry to high-tech and service industries helped to transform Tokyo City into a 
global city of fi nance and business services. It was not until the late 1980s that the 
importance of scale economies in city growth was recognized and considered in 
policy making. The fourth CRDP of 1986 reemphasized the role of Tokyo as a 
“world city” and the need to attract businesses and headquarters. The word  com-
petitiveness began to appear frequently in urban plans and policy documents, 
which signaled a policy shift away from the physically designed spatial arrange-
ment  (Saito and Thornley  2003 ) . 
 Second, lack of infrastructure investment and market demand explained the 
policy ineffectiveness in promoting many designated areas for development—the 
so-called growth poles. Although the central government claimed heavy investment 
for the NIC and SA programs, the per capita public investment index in the NICs 
and SAs was on the contrary below the national average, suggesting insuffi cient 
efforts of local and central governments or unmatched local investments  (Glickman 
 1979 ) . Actual development in these NICs and SAs revealed that neither program 
had achieved the original objectives since they had not yet fully emerged as self- 
propelling growth poles. By 1974, only three of the NICs achieved the targeted invest-
ments, and by 1975, none of the NICs or SAs reached its population growth targets. 
Even with extra efforts in attracting investment and business, population growth in 
NICs or SAs was not necessarily faster than in other cities. In fact, seven out of the 
fi fteen NICs grew slower than other cities in the same prefecture  (Glickman  1979 ) . 
 Third, the policy of balanced and dispersed city growth has not been well 
echoed by other government actions, particularly in infrastructure investments. For 
instance, enormous investment in infrastructure such as the large-scale expressway 
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system (including the Tokyo monorail and the Tokaido Shinkansen high-speed rail-
road) in Tokyo region, as it prepared for the 1964 Olympic Games, had greatly 
improved regional accessibility and further enhanced the regional economic devel-
opment potential. As a result, businesses and fi rms fl owed in, increasing the level of 
economic concentration in Tokyo MA. This strong market demand for develop-
ment also led to the abolishment of the short-lived greenbelt policy. 
 South Korea 
 Similar to in Japan, urbanization policies in South Korea hardly achieved the origi-
nal objectives. Despite many efforts at containing the growth of Seoul and encour-
aging development elsewhere, the growth rate of Seoul’s population was still twice 
as high as that of the national average in the 1980s and 1990s  (Hong  1997 ) . Although 
the population of Seoul City declined slightly since the mid-1990s, the population 
of the entire Capital Region continued to increase. The fi ve urban centers that aimed 
at directing population from Seoul had grown by about 1.9 million people from 
1980 to 1990, but the population of Seoul City also had increased by 2.2 million and 
reached 10.6 million by 1990  (Kang  1998 ) . The planned population targets of the 
Capital Region were exceeded. The First and Second CNPDPs anticipated 1.218 mil-
lion and 1.003 million population growth, while the actual increases were 4.985 mil-
lion and 4.265 million, respectively. 
 Policies designed for shifting the growth from already overconcentrated areas 
to the development promotion areas also proved to be far less successful on both 
national and regional levels. During the 1970–1990 period, population growth rates 
in Development Promotion Areas were always lower than the national average, 
while population growth rates in the Relocation Promotion Areas and Growth 
Management Areas were twice and four times as fast as the national average. 15 
Agglomeration economies in Seoul and the importance of the Korean tradition of 
face-to-face contact in various activities seemed to outweigh the planners’ idealism 
and the government’s regulations. 
 Unlike Japan, South Korea had rigidly applied the greenbelt policy for three 
decades. Despite the success in its implementation, the overall effects of greenbelt 
are regarded as unclear or negative  (Bae  1998 ;  Cho  2002 ;  Kim and Son  2004 ;  Bengston 
and Youn  2005 ) . Strong development pressure and land shortage inside the Seoul 
greenbelt have pushed development to jump over, causing urban sprawl and lead-
ing to negative consequences such as longer commuting time and distance, destruc-
tion of open space, farmland encroachment, rising infrastructure costs, and 
ballooning housing prices. These negative effects have been quantifi ed in empirical 
studies. For example,  Kwon ( 2001 ) ’s study indicated that (1) more than 70 percent 
of the population living in the largest new town Bundang commuted daily to Seoul; 
 15 .  Economic Planning Board,  Population and Housing Census , 1970–1990 (cited from  http://
www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0k.htm ). 
0001312822.INDD   922 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
urbanization in japan, south korea, and china 923
(2) 44 to 68 percent of the population of other new towns commuted to Seoul; and 
(3) only 12 to 28 percent of the population’s jobs were located within its own new 
town.  Jun and Hur’s ( 2001 ) study provided more detailed estimates of the cost of 
greenbelt; they found that under certain assumptions the total commuting costs of 
the “leapfrog” new town development would amount to $42.45 million per year, and 
if travel time is included, this number would rise to $254.59 million per year. 
 The gap between the target and the actual growth in Seoul and the Capital 
Region has also contributed to increasing problems in transportation and housing. 
Land shortage due to the greenbelt cannot escape the blame. From 1980 to 1990, for 
instance, the housing rent index increased 3.2 times while the consumer price index 
increased less than 2 times  (Jun and Hur  2001 ) . The high cost of living, housing 
cost in particular, in Seoul and the Capital Region leads to increases in general 
wages and prices and, thus, the production cost of the nation. As a result, South 
Korea is turning into a very high-labor-cost economy whose sustainability is chal-
lenged  (Bertrand  2009 ) . 
 The failure of South Korea’s urbanization policy during the rapid urbanization 
period can be blamed on similar reasons as in Japan. Economic growth potential in 
the Capital Region was underestimated; investments in infrastructure were not 
directed away from the capital region; the central government’s intention was not 
endorsed by local efforts and infrastructure investment, suggesting inconsistency 
and lack of coordination between governments; and the Capital Region was more 
favored by economic restructuring that moved away from manufacturing to mod-
ern services  (Kim and Donaldson  1979 ; Cho and Kim 1991;  Ahn and Ohn  2001 ) . 
 China 
 Looking at the increases in the number and population shares of small cities, it 
appears that China’s policies have achieved their initial objective of promoting 
small-city development. Among the 467 newly emerged cities from 1978 to 2004, 224 
(about 48 percent) were small cities. The small city’s share in the total urban popu-
lation also increased signifi cantly from 13.0 percent in 1980 to 21.5 percent in 1990. 
Unlike in Japan and South Korea, the urban population share of the large cities did 
not change much, remaining in the range of 38 to 44 percent. 16 
 There are, however, doubts over the effectiveness of the national urbanization 
policy because a signifi cant portion of fl oating population in large cities is not 
counted. For instance, the offi cial data of Beijing’s permanent population ( changzhu 
renkou ) in 2003 was 14.56 million (including people with Beijing  hukou and people 
without Beijing  hukou but who have lived in Beijing for more than six months), but 
the unoffi cial estimate of the total population exceeded 20 million. This is partly 
because there are many uncounted fl oating population living in Beijing as well as 
many other Chinese cities less than six months and partly because an arbitrary crite-
rion (six months) is used to determine who are counted and who are not. 
 16 .  See note 11. 
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 Moreover, the establishment and development of small cities did not help 
much, if any, in reducing either the rural-urban gap or regional development dis-
parity. This is because (1) promotion and granting of city status were based largely 
on political considerations rather than economic foundations and growth poten-
tials; and (2) there was a lack of mechanisms to make rural areas benefi t from indus-
trialization and urbanization. As a result, the ratio of per capita urban income over 
rural income increased from 2.2 in 1990 to 2.8 in 2000, and then to 3.2 in 2004 
(NBSC c). The nominal urban consumption standards remained about 2.5 to 3.0 
times higher in urban compared with rural areas  (Chen and Parish  1996 ) . In addi-
tion, the small city’s share in the total urban population began to decline in the 
mid-1990s. In 2000 its share dropped to 17.9 percent, and in 2004 it further decreased 
to 13.9 percent. 17 
 Similar to Japan in the sense that economic activities have concentrated in the 
Pacifi c Belt, China’s eastern coastal areas have been the center of economic growth. 
In 1978, the eastern region contributed 50 percent of the nation’s GDP, 1.7 times 
that of the central region and 2.4 times that of the western region. This regional 
disparity increased with economic development. In 2004, the eastern region’s 
share of national GDP increased to 58 percent, 2.4 and 3.5 times that of the central 
and western regions, respectively. Gaps in per capita GDP also broadened. In 1978, 
per capita GDP of the eastern region was 1.56 and 1.85 times that of the central 
and western regions; these numbers increased to 2.4 and 3.5 by 2004  (NBSC 
 2005a ) . 
 Despite various efforts to slow down the growth of large cities, they became 
much more important in China’s rapid urbanization. The share of GDP pro-
duced by prefecture-level cities over total national GDP increased from 36 per-
cent in 1990 to 63 percent in 2007. 18 The contribution of big cities to the 
nonagricultural economy was even bigger. In 1998, the prefecture-level cities 
produced 63.7 percent of the GDP in the tertiary sector, and this number jumped 
to 71.5 percent in 2006. 19 The increase in concentration of industrial activities in 
big cities is even more striking. From 1998 to 2006, the share of secondary indus-
try’s GDP produced by prefecture-level cities increased from 47.0 percent to 
65.1 percent. 20 
 Top-down management has been emphasized since the middle of the fi rst 
decade in the twenty-fi rst century in urban planning and land-use planning, even 
though the country is moving greatly toward economic and fi scal decentralization. 
The nature of top-down management in urban planning and land-use planning is 
 17 .  See note 11. 
 18 .  Prefecture-level cities are usually the larger ones, due to historical reasons. There were 188 
prefecture-level cities in 1990. So after discounting this trend, the increase of economic 
concentration in prefecture cities is striking. 
 19 .  Here GDP by nonprimary economies in  shiqu (city districts/city proper) instead of  diqu 
(city administrative territory) are used. 
 20 .  Calculated from data using statistic yearbooks of China cities of 1999 and 2007. 
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manifested in vertical approval requirement. Either the provincial or the central 
government, depending on the city’s size, approves the urban master plan. Similarly, 
in the land-use plan that determines land development and land-use quotas, either 
the provincial or the central government approves the city’s land-use plan. This 
type of top-down management and control can be very effi cient in promoting 
growth in some cities, depending on political preferences and wills. For instance, 
remarkable growth rates in Shenzhen, Kunshan, and Dongguan (to name just a 
few) revealed effective government intervention and profound infl uences in city 
growth. Shenzhen has seen rapid growth since economic reform, with its popula-
tion increasing from 0.33 million in 1980 to 1.68 million in 1990, 7.01 million in 2000, 
and 8.77 million in 2008. 21 Similarly, Kunshan grew from a population of 0.60 mil-
lion in 1992 to 0.73 million in 2000 and jumped to 1.40 million in 2006 and then to 
around 2 million in 2008  (Ding  2008 ) . This type of remarkable urban growth in a 
few cities is achieved through outstanding government maneuvers in resource allo-
cation, large-scale government-led development, massive state-funded investments 
in infrastructure provision, strong government-assisted international trade and 
investment, and, very important by favorably granting development quotas (popu-
lation size, physical size, land use, and land development quotas). This model of 
government control and development for these specifi c cities so far works well, but 
how far it can go and how well this model can be successfully duplicated for other 
cities remains to be seen. 
 The negative sides of top-town management and planning systems can be 
 substantial. This top-down administration is at odds with economic and fi scal 
decentralization that has been one of the key factors for the economic miracle in 
China. Driven by economic incentives, local governments mobilize whatever 
resources to promote growth regardless of the actual demand. In doing so, fi erce 
local competition is a natural outcome. Inevitably, strong motivation and incentives 
behind growth often lure local offi cials to aggressively engage and promote land 
development and in doing so to challenge the effectiveness of vertical management 
and control in the plan and quota approval processes. Local competition directly 
resulting from fi scal and economic decentralization is accredited to outstanding 
economic advance in the past three decades. But it also causes economic overheat-
ing and bubbles that threaten the stability of the macro-economy and undermines 
national macro-policies. In fact, prevailing redundant projects and overinvestments 
in manufacturing resulting from local competition have suggested failure, at least 
partially, of the top-down management in urban growth with the presence of strong 
local incentives. The value of warehoused industrial goods in China, for example, 
was estimated at $200 billion in 2006. The production capacity of the steel sector 
was estimated at 470 million tons in 2005, whereas the actual demand was only 
370 million tons. To make matters worse, the total capacity of steel production 
will cap at 600 million tons when all planned and under-construction projects are 
 21 .  Shenzhen Statistic Bureau,  http://www.sztj.com/main/xxgk/tjsj/tjnj/200911202496.shtml . 
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completed. In some industries, overcapacity exceeds the actual demand by more 
than 100 percent. 22 
 The fi erce local competition also contributes to excessive land conversion, 
motivated by land revenues  (Ding  2009 ) . Overdesignation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) and lack of capital investment cause much converted land to remain 
idle and undeveloped. 23 An SEZ is an administratively established geographic region 
that offers more liberal economic and/or legal incentives than others  (Ding  2009 ) . 
It is usually established to attract foreign investment and to promote international 
trade. In 2004, China had 6,866 SEZs occupying more than 38,000 square kilome-
ters of land. The concerns of rising social unrest from land requisition from farm-
ers, farmland depletion and food security, recognition of an overheating economy, 
and the risk of high infl ation prompted the central government to take aggressive 
measures against the SEZ fever. More than 4,800 SEZs were canceled in the summer 
of 2004, associated with 24,900 square kilometers of land (accounting for 64.5 per-
cent of total SEZ land); more than 1,300 square kilometers of land were forced to 
return to agricultural use  (Cao  2004 ) . It should be pointed out that SEZ fever is 
driven largely by enormous economic success, at least in some of them. SEZs, at 
least some of them, become of great importance to local economies as they emerge 
as prominent hubs in terms of industrial output, employment concentration, and 
FDI. A survey of fi fty-four national SEZs in 2007, for instance, revealed that they 
contributed 5.15 percent of national GDP, 4.1 percent of national tax revenues, and 
23.2 percent of total FDIs. 24 The economic growth rate of the fi fty-four SEZs was 
also remarkable. In 2007, GDP grew by 25.5 percent, more than double the national 
average. 
 Finally, China’s planning system suffers from the ineffectiveness of impacts on 
urbanization and city growth because of its sectoral fragmentation. The fragmenta-
tion of the planning system lies in its sectoral management. Different government 
authorities take charge in different planning practices. Urban planning, for exam-
ple, is undertaken by the Department of Urban Planning. Land-use planning is one 
of the primary responsibilities of the Department of Land and Resources, while 
capital projects and establishment of various SEZs are overseen by the Department 
of Development and Reform. Each of these three departments (Urban Planning, 
Land and Resources, and Development and Reform) play important roles in city 
growth management and can substantially affect the course of city growth, creating 
fragmented administrative and planning systems in which inconsistent policies and 
 22 .  Industrial sectors of severely oversupplied capacities include electrolytic aluminum, 
ferroalloy, coke, calcium carbide, automobiles, copper smelting, cement, electric power, coal, and 
textile goods. Sectors of petrochemical, paper box, chemical fertilizer, domestic electric appliances, 
microcomputers, and shipbuilding also have excessive capacity of production. 
 23 .  There are Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones, Industrial Estates, Urban 
Enterprise Zones, High-Tech Industrial Parks, Science and Technologic Parks, Economic 
Exploitation Zones, and others. 
 24 .   http://www.qetdz.com.cn/zhengcefazhiju/xxdt_content.asp?news_id=12197 . 
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government actions by different agencies often lead to uncoordinated and chaotic 
development patterns  (Ding  2009 ) . This lack of synthesized policy and coordinated 
government actions is accredited with failure in national efforts in managing and 
controlling urbanization and urban growth. 
 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 Experiences of policy responses to rapid urbanization in Japan and South Korea 
may be very valuable for other countries such as China, which is in an era of fast 
urbanization and city growth. Other developing countries can also benefi t from 
China’s experiences. Reviewing the three countries’ interactions between policy and 
urban growth reality leads to the following conclusions. 
 First, policy controls over the course of urbanization are often ineffective if they 
are against market forces. Government efforts have been initiated in Japan and 
South Korea to contain the sizes of Tokyo and Seoul, but they grew to their current 
dominant sizes mostly driven by market forces. Policy and planning measures that 
attempted to spatially disperse economic concentration in the Tokyo region by pro-
moting polycentric urban structure have not delivered their full promises. Instead, 
globalization and upgrading of Japan’s economic structure indeed accelerated the 
growth of the Tokyo region, particularly its core central areas. Similarly, urbaniza-
tion policies designed to restrict population in the Seoul metropolitan area were not 
able to counteract market forces. To make matter worse, some policies even created 
unwanted consequences and generated huge socioeconomic costs even though 
their policy objectives were desirable. The Seoul greenbelt, as discussed earlier, has 
incurred wide criticism for its negative effects. Another example of unwanted con-
sequences is that the prohibition of manufacturing fi rms has led to huge numbers 
of unregistered factories. It is estimated that there are more than 200,000 unregis-
tered factories in the Seoul Capital Region, contributing to unmanaged urban 
development, forgone tax revenue, limits to business expansion due to the inability 
to collateralize unoffi cial assets, environmental degradation, traffi c congestion, and 
the general lowering of the quality of life of residents  (World Bank  2009 ) . 
 China’s experiences echo well with this general conclusion, though the country 
is still in a period of rapid urbanization. Administrative and regulatory approaches 
are proving not to be enough. As mentioned earlier, despite statistical reports of an 
unchanged population share of large cities, the combination of undercounted fl oat-
ing population and unprecedented spatial growth of built-up areas in large cities 
like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen suggests the failure of the policy 
of “strictly controlling large cities.” Although small cities grew quickly in number in 
the 1980s and 1990s, that was mainly due to administrative relaxation in city desig-
nation; the decline of population share of small cities since the mid-1990s implies 
the failure of the policy of “actively promoting the growth of small cities.” 
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 Second, city size does not matter if the city is well planned and coordinated 
with infrastructure and transportation development. It is also clear from all three 
countries’ experiences that urbanization policy will be more effective if it is inte-
grated with market forces. This planning and market integration can be done 
through incentive-based development mechanisms and infrastructure-permitted/
directed spatial growth. In other words, negative externalities from development 
can be priced while growth pressure is accommodated at the same time. The land 
development model around metro station areas in Tokyo offers a best practice of 
public-private partnership in managing urban development. In the model, devel-
opers are required to construct light-rails in exchange for development rights of 
real estate projects. The developers are happy to be able to capture business oppor-
tunities created by improvement in accessibility, while governments are happy 
with private investments in transportation that is also coordinated with land devel-
opment. In contrast, Seoul is more sprawled and has worse problems from conges-
tion and high housing prices, though it applies stricter regulations and controls. So 
what matters most is how a city or metropolitan area is formed (urban spatial 
structure) and served by transportation systems (land use and transportation inte-
gration) so that labor accessibility is maximized and urban transaction costs are 
minimized. It defi nitely is not the city size itself that determines its sustainability 
and competitiveness. 
 Third, policy responsiveness to demand and fl exibility could be important in 
promoting effi cient city growth. Take the greenbelt policy, for example. In Japan, it 
was established with the high expectation of separating central Tokyo from its sur-
rounding areas; however, under economic and social pressures, this policy was abol-
ished in a more responsive way, compared with Seoul, in which the greenbelt policy 
had been strictly applied for three decades despite much criticism and opposition. 
It might be a success in terms of plan implementation; however, the economic effi -
ciency loss and related problems are costly for Seoul. South Korea also adopted and 
enforced rigid zoning designation. It heavily relied on regulatory approaches, leav-
ing little room for market incentives to play a role. China’s planning system shows 
similar characteristics in terms of land-use restrictions on location choice, uses, and 
intensity  (Ding  2009 ) . There are signs in these three countries indicating that policy 
and planning have become more responsive and fl exible in managing urban growth. 
Japan did it during its rapid urbanization, while South Korea released strict regula-
tions in land use in the posturbanization period. Seoul’s fi ve zones were later merged 
into three, and more freedom of land use was granted to the market in the 1990s. 
China is starting to build a unifi ed  hukou system that abolishes rural-urban dis-
crimination and has launched pilot tests of this new system in Chongqing, 
Guangdong, and a few other cities and provinces. 
 Fourth, the national government’s involvement in city growth turns out to be 
very important, particularly in forming and developing metropolitan areas that 
cross different jurisdictions. This is because smooth interconnection of transpor-
tation networks and coordinated service and infrastructure provision are neces-
sary to integrate core urban areas, cities, towns, and surrounding suburbs. Efforts 
0001312822.INDD   928 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
urbanization in japan, south korea, and china 929
to promote economic dispersion and balanced growth also need strong interven-
tion by the national government. In this regard, China is well positioned. 
 Fifth, it is costly to develop new cities or satellite towns. Neither Japan’s NICs 
nor Seoul’s new towns provide successful experiences. In particular, the new towns 
help little in containing Seoul’s growth, but their negative effects are substantial, 
leading to urban sprawl while imbalances between housing and employment loca-
tions cause longer commuting distances. 
 Finally, urban agglomerative effects are the most important driving forces 
causing cities to grow, especially large cities. Due to diffi culties in measuring these 
effects, it is hard to establish strong empirical evidence, which makes agglomera-
tive effects poorly understood among policy and planning decision makers. 
Nevertheless, limited empirical studies have concluded that agglomerative effects 
become more important when a city’s economy upgrades from manufacturing 
toward knowledge-based sectors. The development in both Japan and South Korea 
leads to the conclusion that the larger the city is, the more important it is to invest 
in public transit and to integrate land use and transportation. 
 REFERENCES 
 Ahn, Kunhyuck , and  Yeong-Te Ohn . 2001. “Metropolitan Growth Management Policies in 
Seoul: A Critical Review.” In  Urban Management in Seoul: Policy Issues and Responses , ed. 
 Won-Yong Kwon and  Kwang-Joong Kim , 49–73. Seoul: Seoul Development Institute. 
 Bae, Chang-Hee Christine . 1998. “Korea’s Greenbelts: Impacts and Options for Change.” 
 Pacifi c Rim Law and Policy Journal 7:479–502. 
 Bae, Chang-Hee Christine , and  Myung-Jin Jun . 2003. “Counterfactual Planning: What If 
There Had been No Greenbelt in Seoul?”  Journal of Planning Education and Research 
22:374–383. 
 Bengston, David N. , and  Youn Yeo-Chang . 2005. “Seoul’s Greenbelt: An Experiment in 
Urban Containment.” In  Policies for Managing Urban Growth and Landscape Change: 
A Key to Conservation in the 21st Century , ed.  David N. Bengston . General Technical 
Report NC-265, 27–34. St. Paul, MN: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
North Central Research Station. 
 Bertrand, Renaud . 2009. “A Systemic View of Housing in China’s New Urban Era.” Paper 
presented at the Korean Development Institute, July 16. 
 Bureau of City Planning of Tokyo Metropolitan Government (BCPTMG). 2004. 
“Transition in City Planning in Tokyo.”  http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/apcity/unpan015062.pdf . 
 Cao, D. 2004. “China Cancels 4,800 Development Zones.”  China Daily , August 24.  http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004–08/24/content_368120.htm . 
 Chen, Xiangmin , and  William L. Parish . 1996. “Urbanization in China: Reassessing an 
Evolving Model.” In  The Urban Transformation of the Developing World , ed.  Josef 
Gugler , 61–97. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Cho, Cheol-Joo . 2002. “The Korean Growth-Management Programs: Issues, Problems and 
Possible Reforms.”  Land Use Policy 19:13–27. 
0001312822.INDD   929 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
930 international settings
 Ding, Chengri . 2008.  Research Report: Urban Spatial Development Strategy of Kunshan . 
Working Report, National Center for Smart Growth, University of Maryland (in 
Chinese). 
 ———. 2009. “Policy and Planning Challenges to Promote Effi cient Urban Spatial 
Development during Rapid Transformation in China.”  Sustainability 1:384–408. 
 Douglass, Mike . 2000. “Turning Points in the Korean Space-Economy: From the 
Developmental State to Intercity Competition 1953–2000.”  http://www.ciaonet.org/
wps/dom03/dom03.pdf . 
 Fujita, Masahisa , and  Takatoshi Tabuchi . 1997. “Regional Growth in Postwar Japan.” 
 Regional Science and Urban Economics 27:643–670. 
 Glickman, Norman J. 1979.  The Growth and Management of the Japanese Urban System . 
New York: Academic Press. 
 Henderson, Vernon . 2007.  Urbanization in China: Policy Issue and Options . China 
Economic Research and Advisory Programme.  http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/
henderson/fi nalfi nalreport-2007050221.pdf . 
 Hong, K. 1997. “Regional Policy in the Republic of Korea.”  Regional Studies 31:417–434. 
 Japan Census. 2000.  Final Report of the 2000 Population Census , Statistical tables presented 
in the report.  http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ListE.do?bid=000000030587&cycode=0 . 
 Jun, Myung-Jin , and  Jae-Wan Hur . 2001. “Commuting Costs of ‘Leap-frog’ Newtown 
Development in Seoul.”  Cities 18:151–158. 
 Kang, Myung-Goo . 1998. “Understanding Urban Problems in Korea: Continuity and 
Change.”  Development and Society 27:99–120. 
 Kim, Kyung-Hwan , and  Jae-young Son . 2004. “Spatial Policies towards the Seoul Capital 
Region.” Draft for presentation at the International Seminar on Metropolitan Growth 
Management. June, Seoul.  http://hompi.sogang.ac.kr/kyungkim/freeboard/
papers/2004output/kim-son%20.pdf . 
 Kim, Son-Ung , and  Peter J. Donaldson . 1979. “Dealing with Seoul’s Population Growth: 
Government Plans and Their Implementation.”  Asian Survey 19:660–673. 
 Korea National Statistical Offi ce (KNSO). 2005.  Korea Statistical Yearbook . Seoul: Korea 
National Statistical Offi ce. 
 Kwon, Won-Yong . 2001. “Globalization and Sustainability in Seoul.” In  Urban Management 
in Seoul: Policy Issues and Responses , ed.  Won-Yong Kwon and  Kwang-Joong Kim , 
14–47. Seoul: Seoul Development Institute. 
 Lin, George C. S. 2001. “Chinese Cities in Transition: Dual-Track Urbanization in a 
Transitional Socialist Economy.” Forum on Urbanizing World and UN Human 
Habitat II, June 4–6, Columbia University, New York. 
 Marshall, Alfred . 1920.  Principles of Economics . London: Macmillan. 
 Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM). 2001. “The Fourth 
Comprehensive National Territorial Plan.”  http://english.mltm.go.kr/intro.do . 
 National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 1999.  New China City Fifty Years . Beijing: 
Xinhua Publishing. 
 ———. 2001.  China City Statistical Year Book 2001 . Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 ———. 2005a.  China Statistical Yearbook 2005 . Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 ———. 2005b.  China Compendium of Statistics 1949–2004 . Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 ———. 2005c.  China Statistical Yearbook . Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 OECD. 1987.  OECD Territorial Reviews, Korea . Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
 Osada, Susumu . 2003. “The Japanese Urban System 1970–1990.”  Progress in Planning 
59 (3):125–231. 
0001312822.INDD   930 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
urbanization in japan, south korea, and china 931
 Portal Site of Offi cial Statistics of Japan (PSOSJ). Regional Statistics Database.  http://
www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/CommunityProfi leTopDispatchAction.do?code=2 . 
 Rosenthal, Stuart S. , and  William C. Strange . 2004. “Evidence on the Nature and Sources of 
Agglomeration Economies.” In  Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics , vol. 4, ed. 
 J. V. Henderson and  J. F. Thisse , 2119–2172. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 Saito, Asato , and  Andy Thornley . 2003. “Shifts in Tokyo’s World City Status and the Urban 
Planning Response.”  Urban Studies 40:665–685. 
 Sorensen, Andre . 2002.  The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the 
Twenty-First Century . London: Routledge. 
 Takahashi, Junjiro , and  Noriyuku Sugiura . 1996. “The Japanese Urban System and the 
Growing Centrality of Tokyo in the Global Economy.” In  Emerging World Cities in 
Pacifi c Asia , ed.  Fu-chen Lo and  Yue-man Yeung , 101–143. Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press. 
 World Bank. 2009.  The Spatial Growth of Metropolitan Cities in China: Issues and Options in 
Urban Land Use . World Bank Report. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 Yeung, Y. M. , and  J. Shen . 2008. “Socialist Economies in Transition: Urban Policy in China 
and Vietnam.” In  International Handbook of Urban Policy , vol. 1,  Contentious Global 
Issues , ed.  H. S. Geyer , 59–76. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
0001312822.INDD   931 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
0001312822.INDD   932 7/1/2011   9:01:56 PM
